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Refugee status and religious conversion: The
significance of Refugee Appeal Number 76204
Doug Tennent from Waikato University considers the effect of adverse findings of credibility in a
refugee claim involving religious conversion and cautions the need for support agencies to act with
care when assisting people with refugee determinations
One of the grounds upon which a person may be accorded
refugee status is having a well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted for reasons of religion. A number of claims for refugee
status on the basis of religion have come before the Refugee
Status Appeals Authority (RSAA) over the years. A large
number of such claims have come from Iranians. People come
to New Zealand, convert to Christianity and apply for refugee
status on the basis that conversion (apostasy) will not be
tolerated if they were to return to Iran. Apostasy is a crime in
Iran. Indeed at the time of the handing down of Refugee Appeal
762041 it was noted that a revision had recently been made to
the Iranian Penal Code whereby apostasy, specifically conver-
sion from Islam, would be punishable by death.2 It is also
acknowledged that for certain apostate’s intense pressure and
human rights abuses occur regularly.3
Consequently it can be argued that a well-founded fear of
persecution can be established should an Iranian upon leaving
Iran, convert to Christianity and then be required to return to
Iran after such a conversion. However, it is not as straightfor-
ward as this. People leaving Iran, arriving in New Zealand,
enjoying the freedoms, lifestyle and opportunities, wish to
remain here. Consequently, using conversion to Christianity as
a means of being granted refugee status is a very attractive
avenue for being able to remain in New Zealand. Such claims
need to be considered with caution particularly when such
conversion to Christianity takes place while a refugee appli-
cation is pending.4
It is acknowledged that refugee determination procedures
are very much balanced in favour of the refugee claimant.5
This is necessary as decision makers are addressing potentially
life and death situations for the claimant and decisions are
made in the midst of considerable evidentiary voids because a
claimant has often had to leave his or her country of nationality
or habitual residence in haste.6 Consequently, the standard of
proof required to establish a refugee claim falls below the
balance of probabilities and the rules of evidence are not
applied.7 The generous flexibility, which is necessarily applied
to refugee determinations, also makes them vulnerable to
abuse. People can obtain refugee status through fraud, forgery
of documents, the provision of false or misleading information,
or the concealment of important information.8 The ability to
cancel refugee status where it is consequently discovered that
fraud and other unacceptable means were applied to achieve
refugee status is given statutory recognition in both the
Immigration Act 19879 and the Immigration Act 2009.10 Such
provisions are crucial if the integrity of the immigration system
is to be maintained. Refugee status is accorded to a person
because he or she comes within the required legal parameters
as set out in the Refugee Convention. The fact that a person has
a well-founded fear of persecution means that they can be
recognised as a refugee and be accorded the protections and
rights arising out of this status. To be accorded refugee status
as a result of fraudulent means has two negative outcomes.
Firstly, it undermines the integrity of the refugee regime.
Secondly, it erodes the commitment of states party to the
Convention to ensure that appropriate protection is provided.11
It has the effect of states adopting an unwarranted restrictionist
regime.12
The need for flexibility when making refugee determina-
tions while at the same time guarding against abuse of the
scheme, reflects one of the tensions of refugee law.
Refugee Appeal Number 76204
All of these issues have particular relevance when considering
refugee claims made under the convention ground of religion
from Iranian claimants who have converted to Christianity
since leaving Iran. In this regard Refugee Appeal Num-
ber 76204 by the RSAA is very significant. This case con-
cerned an Iranian refugee. He came from a Muslim family
being the eldest of four children. As he grew up he experienced
or witnessed actions from state officials which made him aware
of the limitations on freedom that were imposed in Iran.13 This
resulted in him leaving for Turkey but returning shortly
afterwards upon the death of his father. When the family
settled down following the bereavement, the appellant left for
Korea where he attended a church which focused on giving
practical assistance to migrants.14 The concern shown by the
church made him interested in Christianity and after some
13 months he maintained that he converted to Christianity. He
informed his mother about this, who, while being initially
shocked, became interested in understanding more about
Christianity. He proceeded to send her videos and photos.
When he asked if she had received them he was informed that
they had been intercepted by the authorities.
The appellant heard that his mother was unwell and
returned to Iran. While in Iran he was informed that the
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authorities were looking for him and making specific reference
to his religion.15 This worried the appellant causing him to find
his way to Turkey, Korea and ultimately, New Zealand. Upon
arrival in New Zealand he made a claim for refugee status. The
claim was unsuccessful with both the Refugee Status Officer
and the RSAA. The basis of the claim was the alleged
discovery of the appellant’s conversion to Christianity and a
claimed risk of lengthy imprisonment, if not execution, in Iran
for his abandonment of Islam.16
The reasons of the RSAA for declining the appeal were the
inherent implausibility of central aspects of the appellant’s
evidence, significant changes to his evidence, inconsistencies
and contradictions.17 For example, one matter raised was the
fact that no visit was made by officials to the appellant’s family
house after the tapes sent from Korea were seized. This was
considered to be implausible.18
The second refugee claim repeated the appellant’s first
claim but added a new and important element. This was the
claim that, in his absence, he had been summonsed to the
revolutionary court, tried and convicted of apostasy and that
the death penalty was imposed. This new issue was supported
by four documents: a letter requesting the appellant to appear
before the court, a summons, the verdict and sentence and a
letter from the appellant’s brother. The letter from the brother
said that the brother, being mistaken for the appellant, had been
interrogated. It further stated that cousins threatened to kill the
appellant upon his return to Iran or at least report him to the
authorities. The letter emphasised that he would encounter
major trouble if he were to return. It also noted that he had
caused significant trouble to the family.19
This was a significant development. After the declination of
the first appeal, a removal order was served on the appellant
which he unsuccessfully appealed.20 The appeal against the
normal order was followed by lodgment of a s 35A application.
This appeal was declined on 12 October 2005, by which time
the appellant had been aware of the death penalty for three to
four months. The Minister of Immigration was not, however,
advised of this particularly significant development.21 When
the appellant was challenged about this during the second
appeal hearing, his response was that he had rung and
informed his lawyer’s secretary about the matter. However, he
did not check to ensure that the secretary had conveyed this
information to the lawyer. He gave two reasons why no check
was made. Firstly, that he lost his mobile telephone. Secondly,
that he was subsequently arrested. When he phoned his
solicitor after his arrest he was informed that his s 35A
application had been unsuccessful.22 This account was com-
pletely different to that given to the Refugee Status Officer
(RSO). He informed the RSO that he had spoken directly to the
lawyer. He claimed that his account to the RSAA was the
correct account. A file note was presented to the RSAA which
clearly indicated that he had phoned the then lawyer’s office,
had spoken to the secretary and requested an update.23 He also
indicated that he would call back later but he never did. From
the file note no mention was made of the death sentence. As the
RSAA noted, it would be expected that he would have stated
that this needed to be conveyed as a matter of urgency.24 It
would also be expected that such a crucial matter would be
followed up on.
Also significant was that the appellant had not been
informed immediately by his family about the court documents
and summons. The appellant’s reason provided for this was
that the family did not take the request letter and summons
seriously but they panicked when they received the court
verdict.25 The claim that a family would not take a summons
from a Revolutionary Court seriously could not be accepted.26
Also the authenticity of the court documents was not accepted
— they lacked detail, had inconsistent wording, and had
inconsistent dates. This led the RSAA to conclude that their
overall appearance gave the impression that the documents
were not genuine.27 For these and other reasons the second
refugee appeal was also unsuccessful.
The third refugee claim, while still maintaining the issues
as advocated in the first and second grounds, added further
grounds essentially related to the appellant’s “fast” or “hunger
strike”, which it was submitted revealed a “genuine” conver-
sion to Christianity, and to the wide publicity which had been
given to his matter.28 It was maintained that the publicity could
not have helped but to have made the Iranian authorities aware
of his conversion thereby making him liable to punishment for
apostasy.29
The grounds advanced in the third appeal make it necessary
to consider the matters of custody, the “hunger strike” and the
publicity attached to this matter especially with regards to the
death sentence.
As noted earlier, the appellant was served with a Removal
Order on 7 December 2005, after which he was taken into
custody. He was in custody when the second refugee claim was
determined. The appellant refused to cooperate with the
authorities in terms of signing the necessary documents to
facilitate his removal back to Iran. As New Zealand had no
agreement with Iran in terms of involuntary repatriation, the
refusal to cooperate amounted, in effect, to an indefinite stay of
the statutory removal process.30 When the non-cooperation
resulted in a refusal on the part of the Court to release him on
specific conditions, the appellant commenced his “fast” or
“hunger strike”.
Before his arrest he had been worshipping at St James
Anglican Parish Orakei. The vicar of St James, acting upon the
request of the appellant, made public the documents related to
the purported death sentence.31 The issue was given extensive
media attention. Further the appellant himself gave two emo-
tionally charged television interviews about his matter. He
maintained that the “hunger strike” would continue until he
was allowed to remain in New Zealand.32 Support for the
appellant was provided by:
— Green MP Keith Locke;
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— Global Peace and Justice Auckland which staged a
protest outside Auckland Central Remand prison;
— The Anglican Archbishop and the Anglican Church’s
Social Justice Commissioner. (Both of these people
considered that his conversion to Christianity was
genuine);33 and
— The vicar and parishioners of St James Parish Orakei.
As the appellant’s “hunger strike” continued the then Minister
of Immigration intervened, because the appellant’s state of
health was precarious.34 The appellant was released on certain
conditions.
In brief the appellant received a significant amount of
support which resulted in considerable media attention.
As with the first and second appeal bodies, the third appeal
body made adverse findings about the appellant’s credibility,
which will be explored in more detail shortly. Further, it was
concluded that the appellant’s actions were self-serving, manipu-
lative and in bad faith.35 Good faith is an essential ingredient
of a successful refugee claim. However, while the appellant
had acted in bad faith, those supporting him had acted in good
faith and this was sufficient to overcome the bad faith on the
part of the appellant.36 This point is discussed later. These
people, acting in good faith, had ensured that a significant
amount of publicity was accorded to the appellant’s matter.
Also of significance was that the publicity given to the case
enabled the Iranian authorities to become aware of the appel-
lant’s claim that he had converted to Christianity and that he
had been sentenced to death for apostasy.37
Country information with regards to those persons sus-
pected of apostasy was seen to be fragmentary, contradictory
and confused.38 There were clearly accounts that apostates
were regularly the subject of human rights abuses.39 Serious
human rights abuses were regularly experienced by those
suspected of apostasy. Suspected apostates especially at risk
were church leaders and proselytising Christians.40 This did
not apply to the appellant. His main issue was the publicity
attached to his case that clearly identified him as an apostate.41
In this regard the panel clearly emphasised that its focus must
be the risk factors specific to individual claimants.42 Applying
this principle to the appellant’s case, it acknowledged that the
publicity which his case attracted could lead to careful scrutiny
of him at the border upon arrival in Iran, which might in turn
lead to criminal charges, detention and ill treatment.43
The RSAA third panel noted that these were only possi-
bilities. Given, however, the gravity of consequences which
could flow from a mistaken finding of “not well founded”, the
authority in applying the principle of the benefit of doubt
concluded by the narrowest of margins that the real chance of
persecution was satisfied on the facts which had been placed
before it.44 He was therefore granted refugee status.
What has been reached is an extraordinary outcome whereby
despite adverse credibility findings by three appellant bodies,
refugee status was granted. This was the result of the RSAA
third panel applying the principles of refugee determinations in
a manner which acknowledges the complexities of refugee
determinations and the grave consequences of wrong decisions
being reached. Despite being accorded refugee status, the
appellant’s attempt to stop the decision being published was
unsuccessful.45 Consequently the finding about his self-
serving and manipulative actions was placed in the public
domain. Again this is a matter requiring further elaboration.
This appeal also raises some significant points concerning
refugee determinations and provides lessons and guidelines for
people assisting refugee claimants. It is appropriate to consider
these points.
The issue of adverse credibility findings
Credibility issues lie at the heart of most refugee determina-
tions. Often the evidentiary voids present in a refugee claim
require that significant weight has to be attached to the
testimony of the claimant or appellant. However, it also needs
to be remembered that the purpose of the hearing of a refugee
appeal is not to determine the truthfulness and genuineness of
the claimant or appellant’s account. Rather it is to determine
whether there is a well-founded fear of persecution. Conse-
quently even though a claimant or appellant’s evidence is
rejected in its entirety, it is possible that refugee status may be
granted on the basis of other material evidence.46
In this matter the appellant produced significant documen-
tation to support his case as well as a number of supporting
witnesses — some being seen as expert witnesses. It is
important to consider the RSAA’s approach and findings to
these.
The questionable documents were:
— Certificates of identification from the church that the
appellant attended in Seoul which supposedly verified
the times that he had been a faithful attendant at the
church;
— Baptism certificates from the same church; and
— The documents relating to the claimed death sentence.
The appellant claimed that his conversion to Christianity
occurred while he was in Korea. Consequently the dates of his
time of arrival and time spent in Korea were significant. There
were two certificates produced with regards to his church
attendance. The first set was produced by the appellant’s first
legal counsel on 30 April 2004, after the first refugee appeal
hearing. These included the verification of dates that the
church was attended plus the translation of a baptism certifi-
cate dated 19 November 2002. The date was said to be a
mistake as it should have been 2000. The second set was pro-
duced by the appellant’s third legal counsel Grant Illingworth QC
some three years and five months later on 27 September 2007.
The two sets of documents regarding his church attendance
gave conflicting dates. One document (the first to be produced)
stated that attendance commenced in March 2000 and contin-
ued until April 2002. Yet the appellant said that he had
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travelled back to Iran in April or May of 2001 and did not
return until February 2002.47 The second set of documents
submitted to the Minister stated that the appellant had attended
the Seoul Migrant Mission church from August 1999–March
2001. These dates conflict with the appellant’s claimed date of
arrival in Korea on 29 February 2000.
The first two RSAA panels had only been aware of one set
of verification certificates. The appellant, when pressed on the
issue of the production of two sets of documents by the third
RSAApanel, maintained that the documents filed by Illingworth
in September 2007 were in fact the first documents that he
received. When pressed to explain about the production of two
sets of documents, the appellant gave two alternative accounts.
The first was that his lawyer had noted the difficulty with the
dates, leading the appellant to contact the church in Seoul —
resulting in the second lot of documents to be provided. The
second explanation was that he himself had noted the difficulty
with the dates and therefore contacted the church in Seoul.
Whichever documents were received first they both conflicted
with the appellant’s account of his arrival and stay in Korea.
Therefore not only were there problems with the conflicting
documents but both documents were inconsistent with the
appellant’s own version of the dates.48 Another observation
worth noting is whether the Migrant Church in Seoul kept an
attendance register of any kind. If the church had a large
attendance and no register was kept it would be hard to clearly
state that a person was a regular worshipper. The conflicting
dates would suggest that the church was guided by the
appellant when preparing the certificates.
The key issue with the baptism certificates was that the
appellant, when first presenting himself as a refugee claimant
upon arriving in New Zealand, maintained that he had never
been baptised in Korea. His explanation for this was because
he considered that baptism required full water immersion.
While on remand at Auckland Central prison he said that he
learnt that baptism by sprinkling was also possible. This made
him realise that on one particular occasion he had been
baptised in Korea.49 However, he sought no further clarifica-
tion from the church in Seoul over the issue of his baptism.
Further, given the significance of baptism to the Christian
faith, it was very hard to believe that he was not aware of the
fact that he had been baptised.50 The conclusion of the third
RSAA panel with regards to the baptism certificates and the
appellant’s account that he was not baptised in Korea followed
by a subsequent realisation that he had been, was that this
amounted to an opportunistic and unconvincing attempt to
reconcile a claim that he was not baptised when baptism
certificates had been produced.51
With regards to the death sentence document at the third
appeal hearing the appellant’s counsel conceded that the court
documents relating to the death sentence were false. The issue
here was whether the appellant was aware of the falsity of the
documents and whether in his dealings with the death sentence
documents he had been sincere, forthright and candid.52 The
conclusion of the third panel was that he had not been. Both
the vicar of Orakei and his work supervisor had disseminated
the documents. However, the appellant had never shown the
vicar of Orakei a copy of the decision of the first and second
RSAA panels and had not made him aware of the concession
that the documents were false prior to the third hearing. The
vicar was first made aware of this by the third panel during the
hearing. The work supervisor had also not been made aware of
the falsity of the documents. This, the third RSAA panel
concluded, was strong evidence of a distinct lack of candor and
openness on the part of the appellant.53 Noting and in effect
supporting the concerns of the second RSAA panel about the
authenticity of the documents, the third RSAA panel con-
cluded that the appellant had deliberately misled all of those
supporters who had taken up his cause in the belief that he had
been sentenced to death.54
Given all of the inconsistencies in the documents produced
and the appellant’s inability to provide convincing explana-
tions on these matters, the third RSAA panel had no hesitation
in making an adverse credibility finding. In their own words:55
He is a manipulative and opportunistic individual who is
indifferent to his sworn obligation to tell the truth.
Attention then focused upon the weight which could be given
to the evidence of a significant number of witnesses supporting
the appellant either written or given under oath at the hearing.
This included members of the parish he attended, the vicar and
the Anglican Social Justice Commissioner (the Commissioner)
who had visited the appellant with the Anglican Archbishop
when he was on his hunger fast. The Commissioner considered
the conversion to be genuine. However, the Commissioner had
not been privy to the evidence produced at the first and second
refugee hearings. Further, he had not sighted either decision
from the first or second RSAA panels. His position was that he
focused on internal spiritual matters rather than external
matters such as the documentary evidence. His concern was
the genuineness of the conversion. He noted the appellant’s
balanced use and understanding of the Bible which exhibited a
considerable amount of depth of faith.56
The third panel held the view that it was not possible to
separate the internal from the external. Truth which is a central
tenant of the Christian faith was relevant to both the internal
and external.57 The conflicts and inconsistencies of the appel-
lant’s evidence which he was unable to explain challenged the
appellant’s integrity and credibility. The appellant had not been
upfront about the previous adverse findings. As the third
RSAA panel noted, the Authority had spent much more time
testing the appellant’s credibility than the other witnesses. This
was evidenced in the two and a half day hearing and the
Authority had been privy to the 1707 page Refugee Status
Branch file.58 The third RSAA panel in emphasising this and
also noting the fact that the witnesses were not privy to prior
adverse finding with regard to the appellant were therefore
unable to place a great deal of weight on the testimony of the
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witnesses. Certainly it was not sufficient to overturn or counter
the adverse credibility findings. The panel was therefore left
clear in its decision that the appellant’s evidence was not
credible and that he was not a genuine convert to Christian-
ity.59 For three panels to find such adverse finding against the
appellant is significant. The third RSAA panel was able to base
its conclusions on much more evidence than the other two.
Such a detailed focus on credibility invites some observations.
There were significant problems with the documentary evi-
dence. Some were incomplete. Other documents, such as the
first and second certificates of identification, were in conflict.
The appellant could not give convincing responses to address
the vagueness and conflicts. If the witnesses in a situation such
as were to be compelling, they needed to address the concerns
raised about the appellant’s credibility. They did not. They
were focused on the appellant’s conversion and their belief of
its genuineness. They had not been privy to adverse credibility
findings.
They had not gained a full understanding of the appellant’s
situation before assisting him and giving testimony in his
favour. This omission meant that they could not address the
issues which concerned the panel regarding the appellant’s
credibility. As the third panel observed such a case cannot be
compartmentalised.60 A genuine conversion to Christianity
requires a commitment to the truth. Such a commitment was
not exhibited by the appellant. The evidence of witnesses
upholding the genuineness of a conversion without addressing
issues raised about the integrity of the appellant is rightly not
going to be accorded a significant amount of weight. Also of
significance is the granting of refugee status despite such an
adverse credibility finding. Usually in such circumstances one
looks to extrinsic evidence such as country information to
determine whether there is a well-founded fear. In this case,
while country information was clearly relevant, the significant
issue in determining that the appellant should be recognised as
a refugee was the publicity given to his situation especially the
alleged death sentence. Had the supporters not acted in the
manner that they did, the requirement to grant refugee status
would not have arisen. The requirement to give protection
despite dishonesty and manipulation says a great deal about the
commitment of the refugee scheme to providing protection and
leads directly into the other important issues of this appeal to
be discussed.
The generosity and flexibility of the refugee
determination process
The conclusion of the third panel was that the appellant had not
converted to Christianity but had played the role of a convert
to further his goal, namely being able to remain permanently in
New Zealand. The third panel further concluded that if he were
to return to Iran he would abandon the role prior to arriving in
the country.61 However, the third appeal introduced a further
ground which if established would stand despite the adverse
findings about the appellant’s conversion and credibility. This
was that the wide publicity given to his hunger strike and the
death sentence would place him at risk if he were to return to
Iran.62 The appellant had not acted in good faith and if the
appeal was to be determined on his actions alone, refugee
status would not have been granted. However, a number of
people had assisted him and in doing so had acted in good
faith. Through the publicity his supporters gave to his situa-
tion, the Iranian authorities could not have helped but notice
the appellant’s claimed conversion to Christianity and the
allegations of the death sentence imposed against him. Refu-
gee law acknowledges a situation where after a person has left
his or her country of nationality or habitual residence, and at
the time of leaving not having a well-founded fear of perse-
cution, circumstances change to the extent that a well-founded
fear could well be established. In other words the circum-
stances in the home country have changed. A person who
comes within such a situation is referred to as a sur place
refugee.63 For example there might be a change of government
which may not respect fundamental human rights. The person
in question may criticize the new regime while outside the
country, thereby making it unsafe for them to return. They
therefore have a well-founded fear. However, it is important
when considering such claims to check that a person has not
undertaken actions for the sole purpose of creating a pretext for
invoking fear or persecution thereby being accorded refugee
status.64 Such an action is made for wrong motives and in bad
faith. Technically such a person should not be granted refugee
status.
However, the RSAA has taken the position that the good
faith requirement should be applied with caution and not
zeal.65 Where the issue of good faith becomes relevant the
matter must be carefully considered. Issues of relevance are:
the degree of bad faith; the nature of the harm feared; and the
degree of risk.66As noted, while the appellant had acted in bad
faith, the people assisting him acted in good faith. In so doing,
while being unaware of a number of important truths, they
inadvertently created the grounds for a refugee claim which
was otherwise without foundation and fraudulent.67 The pub-
licity of the appellant’s situation arising from their actions
made in good faith may have given rise to a well-founded fear.
They therefore contributed substantially to the risk of harm.
The panel held this was sufficient to override the bad faith
qualification.68
The manner in which the third panel has approached the
fact scenario clearly illustrates the legal flexibility and gene-
rosity applied when determining refugee claims. The grave
consequences of error in such determinations require this. But
the cautionary manner with which the good faith requirement
was approached in a sur place determination is only the first
example of the flexibility and generosity applied in refugee
situations. The other example in this case is the application of
the benefit of doubt. This principle, central to refugee deter-
minations, essentially requires that where an appellant author-
ity determining refugee claims is unable to reach a decision
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about refugee status, a decision should go in favour of the
claimant or appellant.69 This principle again acknowledges the
unique situation in which a refugee claimant can find himself
or herself placed when bringing a claim. The RSAA has
consistently advocated that the benefit of doubt principle is to
be applied liberally. The appeal under consideration is an
excellent example of the liberal application of the principle. As
noted earlier, the third panel considered the plight of an
apostate in Iran carefully. While there were significant human
rights abuses against apostates this is mainly directed at church
leaders and converts who exhibited a strong commitment to
proselytise. The appellant was neither a leader nor a proselytiser.70
However, it was acknowledged that given the publicity sur-
rounding his case, extra attention might be given to him upon
his return. This could lead to the appellant being victim of
human rights abuses. The third panel found itself in a difficult
situation of being unable to determine whether the possible
risks faced by the appellant were sufficient to cross the “real
chance” threshold.71 Bearing in mind the gravity of the
consequences which would flow from the wrong decision that
the appropriate threshold had not been reached, the third
RSAA panel determined that it was appropriate to apply the
benefit of doubt and grant refugee status. It was noted that this
was done by the narrowest of margins.72 Again it was the
publicity given to the appellant’s case by supporters acting in
good faith which created the circumstances which led the third
RSAA panel to grant refugee status, being aware of the grave
consequences of a wrongful decision to decline refugee status.
A person acting in bad faith, manipulating circumstances to his
own end, and withholding central truths from those people
tirelessly advocating for him was granted refugee status. Yet
this was necessitated by the publicity given to the appellant’s
alleged conversion and death sentence and the effect that this
might have on the Iranian authorities. This illustrates how
determined the refugee regime is to provide effective protec-
tion even when people have acted in bad faith. If the generous
and flexible approach to refugee determinations establishes
that there is a well-founded fear and the exclusion clauses
contained in the Refugee Convention do not apply, then
protection is to be granted. This is because of the grave
consequences of a wrong decision.
The issue of confidentiality
The cynic reading such a decision might become very critical
of the refugee determination process. Indeed, if the granting of
refugee status were the end of the matter in this case, a certain
amount of cynicism might be justified. However, the issue of
the appellant’s right to ongoing confidentiality arose after the
handing down of the decision. Clearly when people read
Refugee Appeal Number 76204, given the publicity attached to
the matter, they would easily be able to identify the appellant
and the adverse findings of his genuineness and credibility.
Consequently he did not want the decision published. The
requirement to publish decisions arises in s 129Q(3) of the
Immigration Act 1987, which requires that a refugee decision
must be in writing and include reasons both for the decision
and for any minority view.73 Schedule 3C, cl 12 of the
Immigration Act 1987 also notes the importance of publication
for research purposes. However, it must be published in a
manner which does not identify the person. The reason for
publication of decisions goes to the heart of the rule of law.74
It promotes accountability, equal treatment and fairness.75
Precedents are set by way of appeal and such precedents need
to be applied to other cases taking into account the individual
features of the particular case.
The other important reason for publication is that it
encourages the development of refugee jurisprudence. Conse-
quently the Immigration Act 1987 provides for publication
provided that the particulars are published in a manner that is
unlikely to allow identification of the person concerned.76 In
this way a fair balance is established between the need to
disseminate and the need to maintain confidentiality, which in
the refugee context is to protect the safety of the person.
However, the legislation also acknowledges that the statu-
tory obligation of confidentiality cannot be enforced where the
claimant has either expressly or by implication waived his
right to confidentiality.77 The wide publicity in this matter
which included two appearances by the appellant on national
television amounted, in the view of the RSAA to an implied, if
not an express waiver of the confidentiality provisions.78
Indeed after the third RSAA panel released its decision the
appellant and his counsel gave a media conference.79 In the
conference no secrecy was made of the appellant’s identity.
This was seen to amount to a further waiver.80Acknowledging
this, the appellant’s counsel argued that the appellant had not
waived his right to confidentially with regards to [12]–[14] of
the decision. Contained in these paragraphs were the adverse
credibility findings with regards to the appellant. The RSAA
made a very firm response to this. This was that when an
appellant makes public the basis of their claim including the
provision of a document known to be false and makes much of
the ultimate recognition of refugee status, this must amount to
a waiver of confidentiality in relation to the findings of
credibility and fact.81 A reading of the waiver provisions
contained in s 129T(4) of the Immigration Act did not provide
for some form of selective waiver.82 Further, to allow for a
selective waiver would not enable the reader to understand the
deceitful actions of the appellant which in the end justified the
recognition of refugee status.83 It would not provide the reader
with a full appreciation of the decision and how the final
determination was justified.
With no convincing evidence produced to show that there
would be any risk of danger to the appellant through publica-
tion, the RSAA held that the decision should be published.84
Consequently, while the appellant had gained refugee status as
the result of careful manipulation and fraudulently exploiting
the goodwill of supporters to advance his case, such facts were
eventually made known to the public. It was refugee status
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obtained through the exercise of bad faith but through publi-
cation the public became aware of this exercise of bad faith.
This will in turn influence people’s opinions of and approaches
to the appellant. He cannot be said to be a refugee with “clean
hands”.
The need to act with care when assisting
people with refugee determinations
The people who assisted the appellant all acted in good faith.
However, as the third panel noted, that in so acting without
being aware of the facts, they inadvertently created the
grounds for a refugee claim which would otherwise be without
foundation and fraudulent.85 They allowed a person who, in
the view of all the panels, was fraudulent and manipulative to
obtain refugee status. The importance of maintaining the
integrity of the refugee system has already been emphasised
earlier in the paper. Abuse of the refugee system resulting in
people wrongly being accorded refugee status has the danger
of leading states to impose “unwarranted restrictionist pres-
sures” in terms of refugee applications.86 Such restrictions will
impact adversely on genuine claimants. Consequently, groups
such as churches who habitually provide assistance to vulner-
able people such as refugee claimants need to do so with
appropriate caution. Assistance in such situations requires that
a certain amount of research and clarification is undertaken to
ensure that the information relating to a person seeking
assistance prima facie suggests that the person and his or her
alleged concerns are genuine. Enquiries must include all
relevant information. For a senior member of the clergy to
conclude that a person’s conversion to Christianity is genuine
after spending only two one-hour sessions with him while
acknowledging at the same time that a person can walk away
from his or her faith at a moment’s notice is not reflective of
careful scrutiny of the matter.87 Further, to say that one is only
concerned about spiritual matters and be indifferent to the
previous adverse findings about the appellant is not reflective
of the inherent practical aspect of the Christian faith which
requires a balanced approach to be undertaken when assisting
people. To provide assistance to people seeking protection is
what Christians would refer to as a gospel mandate. However,
truth and integrity are central to the Christian faith as well.
Consequently some discernment needs to be exhibited before
undertaking to spend considerable time and energy to assist
such people.
Conclusion
Refugee Appeal Number 76204 is a significant decision. It
shows that in applying the necessarily generous and flexible
provisions of refugee determination a person who manipulates
the process can still be accorded refugee status. This is because
the focus in a refugee claim is on the establishment of a
well-founded fear. Therefore, even if the findings about a
claimant’s credibility are adverse, if evidence independent of
the claimant’s account shows that there is a well-founded fear,
refugee status can be granted. The benefit of doubt principle
affirms that if there is any doubt as to whether the well-founded
fear has reached the required low threshold, then the decision
should go in favour of the claimant. Such a principle is
necessary given the grave consequences for the claimant of a
wrongful decision.
The people who assisted the appellant in good faith created
the circumstances giving rise to a successful refugee claim.
The appellant had selectively withheld important information
from them, such as the decisions from the first two determi-
nation panels and the fact that there was an acknowledgement
that the death certificates were false. While the appellant was
able to gain refugee status through exploitative, fraudulent and
manipulative means, the fact that he had waived his right to
confidentiality resulting in the decision being published meant
that the adverse findings about the appellant were made known
and his claim to victory in the refugee process was limited.
Refugee claims involving religious conversion must always
be treated with caution. Conversion is a subjective process and
its genuineness is very hard to establish. This is where the
internal process of conversion needs to be compared with
external and independent evidence. Some form of consistency
needs to pervade all of the evidence. This will more often than
not assist in determining the genuineness of a claim. People
assisting such claimants need to do so in good faith but with
caution. They need to gain as full a picture of the claimant’s
case as possible. It should be a requirement that people seeking
help disclose all relevant information about their claim. This
includes information which does not advance their claim. In
this way the integrity of the refugee scheme is being encour-
aged.
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